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In addition, it is ironic that the Jones court should say that in lieu of ap-
plying the New York Times standard, it would apply the "constitutionally
well-balanced" rule applicable to reports of judicial proceedings."6 The New
York Times opinion explicitly states that a rule requiring publishers to guar-
antee the truth of their publications is inconsistent with the first and fourteenth
amendments." In the light of such a statement and in the absence of any
express exceptions, it appears that the rule applied in Jones, a rule requiring
a guarantee of accuracy, is contrary to the Constitution.
IV. CONCLUSION
It was once written of the law of defamation: "[Plerhaps no other branch
of the law is as open to criticism for its doubts and difficulties, its meaningless
and grotesque anomolies [sic]. It is, as a whole, absurd in theory, and very
often mischievous in its practical operation."'8 Sixty-seven years later the law
of defamation, although somewhat altered through time, still operates mis-
chievously. The holding in Jones is supported by the broad reach of pre-New
York Times precedent, but it is difficult to understand how such precedent can
now stand.
It appears that the separate standard will remain until this particular point
is brought before the Supreme Court, at which time the Court may wish to
bring this exception within the realm of the New York Times decision. This
would mean that at least with respect to reports of judicial proceedings that
are very much in the public eye, or proceedings that involve public officials or
figures, the plaintiff would have to allege and prove actual malice in order to
recover for libel-regardless of the inaccuracy, unfairness, or impartiality of
the report. Such a decision is called for in order to eradicate yet another
anomaly that has arisen in the law of defamation.
Wayne A. Johnson
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania: Due Process Limitation
in Summary Punishments for Contempt of Court
Mayberry and two codefendants were tried in a state court for prison break'
and holding hostages in a penal institution.! Although court-appointed coun-
sel was available, the defendants represented themselves.! During the course
of the trial and in open court Mayberry referred to the trial judge as a "dirty
sonofabitch," "dirty, tyrannical old dog," "'bum," "stumbling dog," "nut," and
"fool." Mayberry also told the trial judge to "go to Hell" and to "keep his
36Id.
'776 U.S. at 279.
s' Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. REv. 546
(1903).
'The law allegedly violated was PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4315 (1963).2Id. § 4723.1.
'PA. CONST. art. I, § 9 authorizes defendants in criminal cases to represent themselves.
1971]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
mouth shut," and further charged the judge with attempting to run a "Spanish
Inquisition." At the conclusion of the trial, which resulted in a verdict of
guilty, the judge also found the defendants guilty of contempt.' Mayberry
received one to two years for each of eleven instances of contemptuous con-
duct, or a total of eleven to twenty-two years. The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania affirmed,' and the United States Supreme Court granted a writ of cer-
tiorari.' Held, vacated and remanded: The due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment requires that a defendant in state criminal contempt proceedings
be given a public trial before another judge when the judge who was the
personal target of the contemptuous acts waits until the end of the trial to
act. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
I. THE SCOPE OF THE CONTEMPT POWER
Contempt of court is any act which is intended to obstruct, disrupt, or hinder
the judicial process, or which is calculated to lessen the authority of the court
or its dignity.! Contempts of court are usually classified as either direct or in-
direct contempts. Generally speaking, a contempt is direct if it is committed
in the presence of the judge during the course of the trial,8 and it is indirect
if committed out of the presence of the court.!
Inherent power to punish for contempt and to punish summarily those
contempts committed in the presence of the court has long been recognized
as essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings."0 The sentence
for contempt committed in the court's presence is within the court's discretion,
and is open to reversal only for abuse of discretion."
In several instances, the Supreme Court has limited the power of the judge
to assess punishment for direct contempts. In Chef v. Schnackenberg" the
Court held that federal judges may not impose sentences exceeding six months
4PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2041 (1963) authorizes Pennsylvania courts to inflict sum-
mary punishments for contempts of court "[t3o the misbehavior of any person in the pre-
sence of the court, thereby obstructing the administration of justice."
'Commonwealth v. Langnes, 434 Pa. 478, 255 A.2d 131 (1969).
"397 U.S. 1020 (1969).
Contempts are also classified as civil or criminal. As distinguished from criminal con-
tempts, civil contempts involve acts of disobedience consisting solely of refusing to do what
has been ordered, not of doing what has been prohibited. Thus, the punishment for civil
contempt is coercive or remedial, rather than punitive. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S.
364, 369-70 (1966). See also Ong Hing v. Thurston, 101 Ariz. 92, 416 P.2d 416 (1966).
8 A direct contempt is one committed in open court in the ocular presence of the judge
or in any place set apart for the use of any constituent part of the court. In re Estate of
Melody, 42 111. 2d 451, 248 N.E.2d 104 (1969).
9 Ex parte Ratliff, 117 Tex. 325, 3 S.W.2d 406 (1928). See also Ong Hing v. Thurston,
101 Ariz. 92, 416 P.2d 416 (1966).
"0 The Supreme Court has said:
The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the en-
forcement of judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to
the due administration of justice. The moment the courts of the United States
were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject,
they became possessed of this power.
Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (20 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873).
" United States v. Galante, 298 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1962).
12384 U.S. 373 (1966).
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for criminal contempts without a jury trial.13 Later, in Bloom v. Illinois" the
Court provided the contemnor with the same constitutional right to a jury trial
as any other criminal defendant. Since the constitutional guarantees of jury
trial in article 1111" and the sixth amendment " are limited to offenses that
are not "petty" offenses, a judge can assess punishment for "petty" contempts
without a jury." Conversely, punishments for "serious" contempts must neces-
sarily be imposed by a jury. 8 In Duncan v. Louisiana"0 the Supreme Court
extended the right of jury trial to defendants in state criminal cases that, were
they to be brought in federal court, would come within the sixth amendment
guarantee. Thus, state court judges may impose sentences for serious contempts
only with the aid of a jury. Finally, in Frank v. United States"° the Court held
that judges could impose sentences for criminal contempts of up to six months
imprisonment and up to five years probation without a jury trial. Thus, the
distinction between petty and serious contempts is the length of the sentence
imposed.
If a person is cited for separate and distinct acts of contempt as they are
committed, at the end of the trial the judge may add together cumulatively
penalties for those different contempts committed at varying stages of the
trial. 1 However, if a series of acts constitutes but one contempt, or the same
contempt is permitted to continue for several days, there cannot be separate
punishment for each separate act or delay."' In Bloom the Court gave implicit
approval to cumulative sentences by holding that a judge must be able to
punish all petty contempts as incident to the power to preserve order in the
courtroom. If cumulative sanctions were not available as a restraint, the first
contempt would effectively offer immunity for further violations."3
"The Court subsequently held in Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216
(1968), that sentences under six months are considered to be petty.
'" "We accept the judgment of Barnett and Cheff that criminal contempt is a petty of-
fense unless the punishment makes it a serious one; but, in our view, dispensing with the
jury in the trial of contempts subjected to severe punishment represents an unacceptable
construction of the Constitution. ... Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198 (1968).
'5 "The trial of all crimes . . . shall be by jury." U.S. CONsT. art. III, S 2.
1" "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury . . . and be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion .... " U.S. CONST. amend. 6.
17 Criminal contempts are not subject to jury trial as a matter of constitutional right.
Except when specifically precluded by statute, courts have the power to proceed summarily
in contempt matters, regardless of the flagrancy of the offense. The severity of the sentence
imposed, however, may, irrespective of the flagrancy of the offense, entitle an alleged con-
temnor to the benefit of a jury trial. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964).
"See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966), in which the Court held that fed-
eral courts are required to grant a jury trial when the contempt punishment is something
more than a petty offense.
"'391 U.S. 145 (1968).
20397 U.S. 147 (1969).
"See Bullock v. United States, 265 F.2d 683 (6th Cit. 1959).
2A perplexing problem is distinguishing a single contempt from several contempts. In
Gautreaux v. Gautreaux, 220 La. 564, 57 So. 2d 188 (1952), it was held that the test is
not whether there has been a previous adjudication for contempt, but whether the subse-
quent contemptuous act is so interwoven with the previous conduct that it is indistinguish-
able therefrom.
"See Henderson v. James, 52 Ohio St. 242, 39 N.E. 805 (1895). The constitutionality
of cumulative sentences for contempts will likely be determined by the Supreme Court in
the appeal of the "Chicago Seven."
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
In Illinois v.Allen 4 the Supreme Court held that a defendant who continued
to disrupt his trial could be removed from the courtroom and his trial continued
in his absence." The disruptive defendant can, however, regain the right to
be present in the courtroom as soon as he is willing to conduct himself properly.
The Court in Allen found two other constitutionally permissible methods of
commanding order in the courtroom: (1) physical restraint; and (2) citation
of the defendant for contempt of court." In addition, the Court indicated that
a judge may, acting consistently with state and federal law, imprison an un-
ruly defendant until he promises to behave. 7
II. CONTEMPT AND DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
The Supreme Court has traditionally held that the power of courts to punish
contempts in the face of the court without further proof of facts and without
the aid of a jury is not violative of due process of law. 8 The sixth amendment
rights of notice, hearing, confrontation and counsel, as well as the due process
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, have traditionally been held in-
applicable to contempts committed in the presence of the court." If the con-
tempt is not committed in the presence of the court, the Supreme Court has
stated: "Due process of law, therefore, in the prosecution of contempt ... re-
quires that the accused should be advised of the charges and have a reasonable
opportunity to meet them by way of defense .... ."" In Sacher, although the
trial judge waited until the end of the trial to impose punishment for con-
tempt, the Court reasoned that if they were to hold that summary punishment
can be imposed only if the judge acts the instant of the contempt, it would be
an incentive to pronounce, while smarting under the irritation of the personal
attack, what should be a well-considered judgment.2'
When a defendant insults or ridicules a particular judge, that judge's decision
on contempt charges may well be dictated by emotion. In a dissenting opinion
in Green v. United States" Justice Black reasoned that in such a situation a
judge is obviously incapable of holding the scales of justice perfectly fair and
true and reflecting impartially on the guilt or innocence of the accused-thus
denying the defendant an indispensable element of due process of law."3 The
sixth amendment does not specify that the judge must be unbiased, but the prin-
ciple is fundamental to our idea of a fair trial, and support for it has been found
4397 U.S. 337 (1970). See Note, The Power of the Judge To Command Order in the
Courtroom: The Options of Illinois v. Allen, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 671 (1970).
25 397 U.S. at 343-44.
MId. at 345.
27 Id. at 344.
28 The power of the courts to punish contempts in the face of the court without further
proof and without the aid of a jury is in accord with due process of law. MacInnis v. United
States, 191 F.2d 157 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 953 (1951).
"
8 See Note, Summary Punishment for Contempt: A Suggestion That Due Process Re-
quires Notice and Hearing Before an Independent Tribunal, 39 S. CALIF. L. REV. 463
(1966).
31Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925). See also Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S.
289 (1888).
11 Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 11 (1952).
22356 U.S. 165 (1958).
1 Id. at 199 (dissenting opinion).
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in the requirements of due process in the fifth and fourteenth amendments.' In
Cooke v. United States Chief Justice Taft stated:
The power of contempt which a judge must have and exercise.., is important
and indispensable. But its exercise is a delicate one, and care is needed to avoid
arbitrary or oppressive conclusions. This rule of caution is more mandatory
where the contempt charged has in it the element of personal criticism or at-
tack upon the judge. The judge must banish the slightest personal impulse to
reprisal, but he should not bend over backward and injure the authority of the
court by too great leniency ... a judge called upon to act in a case of contempt
by personal attack upon him, may, without flinching from his duty, properly
ask that one of his fellow judges take his place.'
A judge may be disqualified from sitting at the trial of a case for various rea-
sons, such as interest, 6 relationship,37 bias or prejudice, 8 and prior participation
in or in connection with the cause."9 In several cases the Supreme Court has
considered the question of whether a judge should be disqualified from hearing
contempt proceedings because the contempt was committed against him and he
waited until the end of the trial to assess punishment. Although it is well settled
that a judge is not disqualified solely on account of the fact that the contempt
was committed against himself," it is not clear whether a judge is disqualified
solely because he waits until the end of the trial to assess punishment.
The Court has generally looked to the facts of each case to determine the
extent of the involvement of the trial judge. Early Supreme Court cases sug-
gested that the judge would not be disqualified regardless of the intensity of his
involvement with the contemnor. In Fisher v. Pace1 the Court held that the
judge's personal involvement did not justify a substitution of judges, even
though the judge was embroiled in a heated argument with the contemnor.*'
The Court later adopted the view that a presiding judge's strong emotional bias
might be a sufficient basis for disqualification. In Offutt v. United States the
Court set aside a summary citation of contempt in which the judge had been
involved in an "intermittently continuous wrangle" with the con temnor, the
Court stating that the judge had become so "personally embroiled" with the
contemptuous attorney as to make the judge unfit to sit in judgment on the
contempt charge. 3 More recently the Court modified its position in Offutt by
holding in Ungar v. Sarafite"4 that merely a strong emotional involvement on
4 In In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955), the Court said: "A fair trial in a
fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of
actual bias in the trial of cases."
'3267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925).
'American Cyanamid Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966);
Roberson v. United States, 249 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1957).
"
7 MacNeil Bros. v. Cohen, 264 F.2d 186 (1st Cir. 1959).
"3Knapp v. Kinsey, 232 F.2d 458 (6th Cir. 1956); Garden Homes, Inc. v. United
States, 210 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1954); Mitchell v. United States, 126 F.2d 550 (10th Cir.
1942); United States v. Thomas, 299 F. Supp. 494 (E.D. Mo. 1968).
39in re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); United States v. Vasilich, 160 F.2d 631 (3d
Cir. 1947); United States v. Maher, 88 F. Supp. 1007 (N.D. Me. 1950).4 See Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517
(1925); United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906).41336 U.S. 155 (1949).
41Id. at 163.
-348 U.S. 11, 17 (1954).
44376 U.S. 575 (1964).
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the part of the judge did not require disqualification. In Ungar the Court held
that a lawyer's challenge, though "disruptive, recalcitrant, and disagreeable
commentary," was still not "an insulting attack upon the integrity of the judge
carrying such potential for bias as to require disqualification." On the other
hand, it seems well settled that a judge is not disqualified from punishing as
contempt an attack upon him personally when he acts immediately and without
delay."
III. MAYBERRY V. PENNSYLVANIA
In Mayberry v. Pennsylvania" the Supreme Court held that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that the contempt be tried before
another judge when the judge who was personally the target of the contemptu-
ous acts waits until the end of the trial to act. The majority stated that such a
holding was appropriate because: (1) marked personal feelings were present
on both sides; and (2) "[w]hether the trial be federal or state, the concern of
due process is with the fair administration of justice."" Declining to follow the
reasoning of the Court in Sacher that summary punishment for contempt is an
exception to the requirements of due process even when all punishment is as-
sessed at the end of the trial," the majority stated that "[due process] can be
satisfied only if the judgment of contempt is vacated so that on remand another
judge, not bearing the sting of these slanderous remarks and having the imper-
sonal authority of the law, sits in judgment on the conduct of petitioner as
shown by the record."'45
Thus, the Court avoided any problem of reconciling its prior interpretation
of the trial by jury limitation on summary contempt sentences exceeding six
months," concentrating instead on the Fisher, Oflutt, and Ungar line of reason-
ing that a judge may in some instances be disqualified from sitting in judgment
on the contempt charge." In so doing, the Court departed from its reasoning
in Sachet that punishment for contempt should be a well-considered judgment
rather than an act at the instant of the contempt,"' and adopted instead a test
that will likely encourage the prompt handling of the contempt. While recog-
nizing that a judge cannot be driven out of a case, the Court stated: "[Wlhere,
however, [the judge] does not act the instant the contempt is committed, but
waits until the end of the trial, it is generally wise... to ask a fellow judge to
take his place."' 4 Thus, the Court adopted the reasoning of Chief Justice Taft
in Cooke, but extended it to include a requirement based on due process that
the contempt be tried before another judge.
The Court said that "[w]hether the trial be federal or state, the concern of
I Id. at 584.
"See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925); Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United
States, 237 F. 986 (6th Cir. 1916), aff'd, 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
41400 U.S. 455 (1971).
" Id. at 465.
"See note 31 supra, and accompanying text.
'o 400 U.S. at 466.
"See notes 13-21 supra, and accompanying text.
See notes 36-46 supra, and accompanying text.
"Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 11 (1952).
1400 U.S. at 463-64.
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